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INCREASING UNDERSTANDING 
TO REDUCE RISK
In the new International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 
07.14, risk is defined as “the effect of uncertainty on objec-
tives.”1 Uncertainty arises when we don’t have enough infor-
mation on a subject or situation to be confident about taking 
the right decisions. An important part of the overall infor-
mation and risk management process is the identification and 
use of KPIs that tell us about important aspects of our opera-
tional activity and the extent to which we are succeeding in 
pursuing goals and objectives. This article looks at the ques-
tion of KPIs within HMA. It identifies specific KPIs that are 
likely to be particularly relevant and considers both the op-
portunities that the adoption of such indicators bring as well 
as some of the risks associated with them.
Key Performance 
Indicators and HMA
by Roly Evans [ GICHD ] and David Hewitson [ Fenix Insight, Ltd ]
Photo above: Pattern-minefield clearance by MAG (Mines Advisory Group) in Mantai, Sri Lanka. The locations of cleared 
anti-personnel mines are represented by yellow pickets. Clearance of dense patterns minefields in countries such as 
Sri Lanka can give impressive KPIs such as low m²/mine cleared figures. 
Image courtesy of GICHD/Roly Evans.
Measuring performance is the norm across a range of human activities. But is it a norm in humanitari-an mine action (HMA)? Some might suggest that 
it is. However, if we measure our performance, it is unclear 
whether we do so in a standardized way so that meaningful 
comparisons can be made. HMA lacks standardized indica-
tors, whether it is for items of explosive ordnance (EO) found 
and destroyed, m2 of land released, or more general outcomes 
such as internally displaced persons returning to an area once 
cleared. Indicators can of course be ignored, misused, misre-
ported, misunderstood. The playing field for operators may not 
be level. However, this is not a reason not to use key perfor-
mance indicators (KPIs); it is a reason for standardizing their 
use. The time is overdue for mine action to develop standard 
indicators with agreed definitions in order to measure, under-
stand, and compare performance more accurately.
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PAST PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT 
IN HMA
Performance measurement has a 
mixed history in HMA. In the ear-
ly years of HMA, the promotion and 
pursuit of individual performance in-
dicators led to distortion of some man-
agement decision-making. The pursuit 
of m2 of cleared land sometimes result-
ed in the expenditure of time and mon-
ey clearing large areas that contained 
no explosive hazards. Money was of-
ten wasted on areas that need not have 
been a priority at the time or that were 
not put to subsequent use. Chasing the 
number of mines cleared sometimes led 
to the clearance of areas that had little 
or no impact on affected populations. 
Opportunities were missed to maxi-
mize the benefits provided to affected people. 
In the 2000s, attention turned to how to avoid clearing 
land that did not contain hazards. Improved methods and ap-
proaches coalesced into the concepts known collectively as 
land release. More recently, additional efforts have been ap-
plied to concepts of results-based management and the need 
to understand better the outcomes and impacts accruing from 
the release of land.2
Historically, the focus on the figures m2 “cleared” was under-
standable. The measurements were consistent with the intent 
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Article 
5, where State Parties undertook “to ensure the destruction of 
all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control ...”3 However, in isolation, m2 don’t necessarily re-
veal much about how successful and efficient work has been. 
For a given area of land that was cleared, how would we decide 
whether the effort to clear that land was reasonable? Would 
it be m2/item of EO cleared? If so what level of effort would 
we deem acceptable? 100 m2/item, 1,000 m2/item, 10,000 m2/
item, 100,000 m2/item? The type of item is, of course, relevant. 
One thousand m2/anti-personnel mine might be deemed rea-
sonable, 1,000 m2/7.62 x 39 mm cartridge probably wouldn’t.
In the absence of clearly defined standards, operators often 
choose their own indicators, establishing their own rules for 
counting key data, and interpreting data reporting require-
ments in whatever ways seem to make the most sense or that 
yield the most favorable figures. Does any IMAS or National 
Mine Action Standard (NMAS) currently list standard KPIs 
for reporting? How many standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) detail standardized KPIs for reporting? The result is 
a situation in which there is a great deal of uncertainty about 
what constitutes “good” performance across the sector.
STANDARDIZATION 
OF KPIs IN HMA
Standardizing KPIs in HMA would bring important ben-
efits. Donors and national mine action authorities (NMAAs) 
would be able to compare operational outputs and outcomes 
more easily. Operators would be more confident about dem-
onstrating performance on a level playing field. The challenge 
is to agree which performance indicators should be standard-
ized. Some core KPIs, especially in terms of land release, may 
be easy to identify while others might have more situation-
specific value and be deemed discretionary. As a first step, it 
could be sensible to develop a set of core KPIs that can mea-
sure operational performance—especially but not exclusively 
in the context of land release—and a set of recognized discre-
tionary KPIs that are available for use as and when relevant. 
Adopting standardized KPIs brings risks and challenges too. 
In order for data not to be misrepresented, common “count-
ing rules” should be agreed and established, dictating clearly 
and unambiguously how data is to be measured, collected, re-
corded, and reported.
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Figure 1. Analysis of m2/mine by number of mines at site, including “best fit” 
curves, Afghanistan pre–2009 in blue, 2009–2012 in red: Survey Action Center 
(SAC) Afghanistan Database Project 2012. The fact that the red line is lower 
than the blue line implies an increase in average land release targeting effi-
ciency within the pre- and post-2009 figures. Base data was provided by the 
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA).
Figure courtesy of David Hewitson.
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POTENTIAL CORE KPIs
KPIs selected as core should relate directly and fundamen-
tally to questions of success. In HMA success typically means 
working safely, minimizing environmental impact, complet-
ing work on time and on budget, ensuring that no hazard 
items are left in released land, and helping achieve results that 
make a real difference to affected people.
TARGETING OF EFFORT: M2/
EO item (Disaggregated)
The area cleared per hazard item is an indicator of efficiency 
in the targeting of assets. Mines in a well-recorded, intact, reg-
ular pattern are likely to be relatively easy to locate. Clearance 
work can focus on the specific rows where the mines are found, 
and decisions about when to stop work can be made ear-
ly and with confidence. The m2/mine KPI is likely to be very 
low (possibly in single figures). In an area subject to a cluster- 
munition strike, unexploded submunitions may be widely 
separated (within an overall footprint) and exhibit a limit-
ed pattern. The m2/submunition figure is likely to be higher 
(perhaps hundreds). In an area containing only one or two nui-
sance landmines, the figure may be over ten thousand. Figures 
for the clearance of general explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
may be different again. Disaggregation of EO type is essential 
to ensure that comparisons are like-for-like and to provide op-
erations managers with meaningful information.
On the one hand, m2/EO provides an indication of how 
easy (or difficult) it is to define the extent and distribu-
tion of contamination within an area. On the other, it re-
f lects how successful operators are at defining the extent 
and arrangement of the contamination. Two organizations 
approaching a similar area of contamination could yield 
different m2/item results ref lecting the general availability 
of information, how well Non-technical Survey (NTS) was 
conducted, how well Technical Survey/clearance work drew 
on the results of the NTS, and how well decision-making 
worked during site operations.4 
M2/EO brings significant benefits and advantages. The first 
is that the two pieces of data necessary to calculate the KPI (m2 
and number of items) are perhaps the only two pieces of data 
that at least should be recorded at almost every land release 
site since the beginning of modern HMA. Secondly, analysis 
of this indicator in a number of countries suggests that, espe-
cially with respect to landmines, there is a remarkably consis-
tent relationship between the number of mines found at a site 
and the amount of land that is investigated (Figure 2). Where 
there are few mines, it is relatively difficult to find them effi-
ciently; where there are very many, it is much easier. The gen-
eral statement may be obvious, but the nature of the curve 
that arises from the analysis suggests the potential to establish 
benchmark figures that could be applicable across many or 
all programs. Benchmarks need not generally be used as tar-
gets but instead reflect typical performance across a range of 
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Figure 2. M2/mine data from Tajikistan (in red) showing the generally close alignment with the data from Afghanistan 
(in blue): Survey Action Center Tajikistan Land Release Project Report 2011. Base data was provided by MACCA and 
the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC).
Figure courtesy of David Hewitson.
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operators, regions, and programs. In doing so, they help HMA 
managers understand where the performance of their opera-
tions sits relative to sector performance as a whole, identify-
ing both occasions when above-benchmark performance could 
usefully be shared to help others benefit, and those when the 
reasons for below-benchmark performance should be ques-
tioned. With improved collection and analysis of performance 
data, a range of benchmarks could be established for different 
types of contamination, activities, and circumstances.
While m2/EO item helps us understand the efficiency of 
clearance activity, it also provides an indication of the effec-
tiveness of decisions and activity undertaken earlier in the 
overall land release process: a low m2/EO item figure is also 
likely to reflect effective NTS and operational planning. KPIs 
often help us understand more than one aspect of an opera-
tional process, providing information about efficiency in one 
respect, effectiveness in another, and perhaps progress or com-
pliance in yet another. 
PRODUCTIVITY: M2/Asset/Time
Productivity, defined as the rate of production, has been 
widely measured in HMA for most of its history. It has clear 
value but needs to be handled carefully if it is to provide use-
ful, comparable information about performance. The KPI 
can tell us the rate at which ground is being searched, how 
search rates change over time, how rates differ between sites 
and teams, and how rates relate to original planning assump-
tions. However, KPIs rarely tell the full story in isolation, and 
comparisons need to be done in context. If one team searches 
more m2 in a given period of time than another, it does not 
necessarily mean it is more efficient. It does mean that opera-
tions managers should understand why such differences arise 
and be prepared to investigate if the causes of differences are 
not readily understandable.
Productivity KPIs are especially susceptible to misun-
derstanding if they do not offer like-for-like comparisons. 
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Figure 3. M2 productivity/deminer, ratioed to a standard six-hour day equivalent (to ensure like-for-like comparability). 
A general upward trend in the KPI indicates deminers becoming familiar with site conditions. Stand out peaks in pro-
ductivity were associated with areas where adjacent mines were blown in situ, breaking up nearby soil and vegetation, 
making it much easier for deminers to progress.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.












        
Day on site
N
o.
 o
f m
in
es
 fo
un
d
Figure 4. Mines found/day, a relatively clean site profile associated with a pattern minefield.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
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FIELD NOTES
Some programs choose to use m2/team/week; others use 
m2/deminer/day; others m2/deminer/hour. Not every team 
may be the same at all times; team numbers may f luctu-
ate through sickness, leave rostering, or logistic constraints. 
The working week and day may vary ref lecting weather con-
ditions, travelling time, security issues, and other contex-
tual factors. KPIs work best when they use unambiguous 
base data (m2, the deminer, and the hour are all uniquely 
defined), but even then it is important to ensure that com-
mon counting rules are adopted. If the same m2 has been 
processed by machine, dog, and deminer, is it counted three 
times, under separate KPIs, or once under a single land re-
leased heading for instance?
Productivity in land release is also strongly influenced by 
local circumstances and conditions. High levels of metal con-
tamination can require more time-consuming excavations, 
slowing progress. Metal contamination might be such that the 
only option is full excavation, an even slower search process. 
Contamination type, slope, vegetation, soil type, and ground 
conditions (e.g., hard, wet, etc.) may also have a significant effect. 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT KPIs
A number of simple quality management KPIs are also of 
value to the sector. Typically these center on the occurrence 
and severity of nonconformities, identified by organization-
al unit (e.g., a team), date, and management system aspect; 
whether it relates to quality, safety, or the environment; which 
standard or SOP requirement has not been satisfied, etc. Such 
KPIs have value when comparing teams in the same operating 
environment, looking for trends in performance, and when 
identifying aspects of standards or procedures that seem to 
be causing difficulties. However, there are potential problems 
when trying to compare differing quality management re-
gimes in different countries. There is also the issue that many 
NMAS do not provide detail on the severity of different types 
of nonconformity. Accredited SOPs effectively list working re-
quirements, but what requirements relate to major, minor, and 
critical nonconformities is also too often not specified clear-
ly and consistently enough. Some contracts do specify, and 
IMAS 07.40 provides general guidance, but this is not univer-
sally applied. More clarity will be required in order for fair 
KPIs for quality management to be developed.
One quality KPI that may merit particular attention is EO 
remaining in released land. The absence of EO is a primary 
indicator of effectiveness of the land release process. If a haz-
ard item is missed it indicates that the land release process 
has failed in some regard. Deciding what to do in the event 
that this specific nonconformity KPI is “non-zero” relies upon 
a thorough and reliable investigation and root cause analysis 
leading to appropriate and effective corrective and preventive 
actions.5 This is an important indicator, but one that needs to 
be used with care by authorities, donors, and clients if opera-
tors are not to be frightened into avoiding or concealing dec-
larations to avoid punitive measures.6 
MAKING A DIFFERENCE: 
OUTCOME INDICATORS
Land release is also effective when it releases land that is 
used to yield developmental value. Developing meaningful 
outcome indicators to improve understanding of the benefits 
that arise from HMA is a challenging task, one that has yet to 
be meaningfully addressed by donors, authorities, and opera-
tors within HMA. However, even in the absence of an agreed 
selection of such outcome KPIs, there are some indicators that 
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Figure 5. Mines found/day, an irregular profile associated with a mined area that is harder to “unlock.”
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
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could be adopted. The simplest is a comparison of the use of 
land following release against the expectation of its use reflect-
ed in the prioritization and planning process. If land is used in 
the way that was expected, it indicates that the overall tasking 
and land release process has been effective. If land is not used 
at all, or used for some unexpected purpose, then it indicates 
some failing in the overall system. Other KPIs that could be 
considered include the number of IDPs (internally displaced 
persons) returning/ha of released land, or number of IDPs 
returning/released buildings. HMA KPIs could potentially 
be developed and agreed that link directly to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs).
POSSIBLE DISCRETIONARY KPIs
Other KPIs may be useful and should be considered.
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Figure 6. Progress chart showing a period when the production rate fell below the target line, followed by the de-
ployment of additional clearance assets to increase the production rate and final completion around the target date.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
SITE CHARACTERISTICS: ITEMS 
FOUND PER WORKING DAY
Plotting the number of items found each working day 
brings a time-based, rather than a geographical perspective 
to land release. Once again, disaggregation of data is impor-
tant. In a mined area, the shape of the KPI profile provides 
additional indications about how successfully the extent and 
distribution of contamination is being predicted. At regu-
lar, easy-to-define sites, a “clean” pattern might be expected. 
There may be a few mines at the beginning during “breach-
ing” toward mine rows, a larger number during clearance in 
the main mined area, and a period when no mines are found 
at the end during “fade out” prior to the decision to declare 
the site complete. 
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Figure 7. Duration variance by task. Tasks below the zero line were finished faster than expected; those above it later. 
In a perfectly planned project, all tasks would show as zero. In reality various “real world” factors may affect this KPI.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
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lies, and statistics.” This is of course not a good argument for 
not using statistics or KPIs. It is, however, a good argument for 
not misusing data and indicators, as KPIs must be interpreted 
in context. Taken in isolation they can give rise to misleading 
or invalid conclusions. Comparison of the m2/mine figures be-
tween a pattern and nuisance minefield could lead to an as-
sumption that one was inefficient compared with the other, 
but nuisance minefields also need to be reduced and cleared. 
Different field conditions (i.e., with varying contamination and 
vegetation levels) may explain significant variation in perfor-
mance figures at apparently similar sites. There is currently no 
standardized way of recording field conditions to help under-
stand variations in performance figures. The ability to disag-
gregate performance data by site characteristics would provide 
further support to improved understanding and decision- 
making. The nature of the contamination present at a site also 
influences performance. One minefield might contain easy to 
detect metal-cased, anti-vehicle mines, another minimum-
metal, anti-personnel mines that are extremely hard to detect. 
Other considerations include how dangerous a mine is during 
excavation and removal and whether booby-traps are present 
as well as the effects of aging and degradation.
The results of one KPI often help us monitor the quality of 
another. Much like the navigator of a ship looking for con-
stant logical consistency between different sources of infor-
mation about the position of the vessel, any inconsistency in 
the implications of different KPIs demands management at-
tention to find out why. If the m2/EO item for a typical team 
working in average conditions is low (implying that items are 
Metal contamination is one of the key factors affecting 
m2/searcher/day. The image above shows an area where 
the battle area clearance (BAC) searcher has excavated 
many times for each m² in the search for explosive sub-
munitions. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
BAC on a hillside in southern Lebanon. The rocky nature 
of the ground, the vegetation, and the steep slope, along 
with the hot working conditions, are all factors that might 
affect KPIs such as m²/searcher/day. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
At sites where less information is available, or where it is 
harder to predict where contamination may be present, less 
regular profiles are likely.
PROGRESS: Proportion of  
Task Achievement
The percentage of task objectives achieved against time is 
one of the simplest indicators, but it is often ignored in HMA. 
It requires managers to predict both output at a site and the 
expected duration of work, which is not always a straight- 
forward task. Even where no deadline is set, or where there 
may be some uncertainty about the volume of work expected 
at the site, HMA managers should be encouraged to set figures 
and monitor progress toward them, even if time and output 
targets need to be updated in light of new information.
PLANNING VARIANCE
Comparisons between when tasks are expected to be imple-
mented against when they actually take place, and of planned 
duration against actual duration, provide indications of the 
reliability of planning processes. As with any KPI, there may 
be good reasons for differences between planned and actual 
activity, but managers should generally expect the reliability 
of planning to improve over time.
VIEWING KPIs IN CONTEXT
One of the erroneous arguments against the systematic use 
of KPIs in HMA is that they can be presented in a misleading 
way along the lines of the old apocryphal phrase, “lies, damn 
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likely to be found relatively frequently), 
but the finds/day figure is also low (im-
plying that items are not found often) 
then it indicates a possible inconsisten-
cy requiring management attention—
there may be many acceptable reasons, 
but there may also be an underlying 
data collection and reporting problem.
DATA COLLECTION
Indicators require accurate data. 
Unfortunately, HMA operators do not 
always collect enough data to a sufficient 
standard to generate meaningful KPIs. 
The first step therefore in generating any 
meaningful KPI is the collection of ac-
curate and relevant data. In selecting 
what we want to monitor by means of 
KPIs, we are selecting what data we wish 
to collect. The use of electronic devices 
such as tablets and mobile phones has 
revolutionized reporting in HMA in the 
last decade. The standardized data input 
and the real-time view of operational 
data such methods enable—often im-
mediately represented on dashboards—
has been a huge help to the sector in 
several countries. However, regardless 
of the benefits of technology, the key 
to such data collection is the design of 
the actual forms, whether they are elec- 
tronic or paper-based. 
It is no exaggeration to suggest that 
forms are among the most important 
documents in HMA yet little attention 
is given to their design. A form should 
seek to capture, as accurately as possi-
ble, the necessary data. Long forms are 
rarely filled out carefully and there is 
a finite amount of data that operators 
can practically extract from the field. 
The imperative is therefore to select 
the most relevant data to capture. It is 
a choice, with data priorities preferably 
reflected in the forms. Ideally, an opera-
tor should decide the KPIs they wish to 
measure while designing the forms that 
will capture the all-important data in 
A SafeLane Global Ltd site supervisor in a waterlogged minefield west of 
Mount Longdon, the Falkland Islands. Weather and the resulting ground condi-
tions can have a significant effect on search and clearance KPIs. 
Image courtesy of GICHD/Roly Evans.
Clearance of an AP minefield in dense vegetation. Such vegetation will signifi-
cantly reduce the m²/deminer/day. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
the first place. Designing forms might not be the most glamorous job in HMA, but 
it is among the most important.
STANDARDIZED DATA REPORTING
Meaningful indicators also require standardized data reporting. The principles 
of common counting rules and like-for-like comparisons are essential, but these 
are not necessarily applied in HMA. For example, m2 reported as land released of-
ten leads to the suspicion that the figure represents mostly cancelled land, a prod-
uct that is much cheaper to produce than m2 cleared. M2 reported as cleared can be 
heavily inflated and doesn’t always represent the area that has been fully searched or 
where hazards have actually been removed. It is still not clear that m2 indicated as 
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either cancelled, reduced, or cleared is reported consistently. 
For example, say an organization physically cleared 15 per-
cent of a confirmed hazardous area (CHA) in order to find 
100 anti-personnel mines a record indicates is present, how 
would the other 85 percent be reported? Would it be counted 
as cancelled, reduced, or cleared? There are reasonable argu-
ments for each option. However, there are not yet common 
counting rules for such a scenario.
The reporting of EO is another area where all is not nec-
essarily what it seemed to be in the past. Often a very gener-
al figure of unexploded ordnance (UXO) might be reported. 
What that type of UXO might be is too often unspecified. 
Sometimes it can simply be small arms ammunition, which 
in any case is not UXO but abandoned explosive ordnance 
(AXO), or it can be larger caliber items that have not been 
armed or damaged. It is notable that much that is found on 
the battlefield is AXO. Firstly, correct reporting of ERW un-
der Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons defines ERW as either UXO or AXO.7 Best practice 
would require adherence to this protocol. Secondly, if oper-
ators routinely recorded whether an item of ordnance was 
armed or not, better systematic risk management would be 
possible. The issue has further been emphasized by the lack 
of standardized reporting of IED contamination, where the 
need for databases to act as a tool for risk or threat assessment 
is even greater. In Iraq and Syria there have been instances of 
IED components such a 9 V batteries being reported as IEDs 
in databases, leading to situations where reported figures on 
IEDs are false. Once again, the need to establish common 
counting rules and like-for-like comparisons is clear.
INTEGRATING KPIs 
INTO DAILY WORK
KPIs are already being used by a num-
ber of clearance organizations who mon-
itor their operational outputs by using 
dashboards. Some organizations integrate 
graphical representation of KPIs into key 
reporting documents. This way, the use of 
KPIs is fully integrated into the work of 
the program and has become a norm. 
Dashboards are becoming standard-
ized across HMA and can be an effective 
way of easily monitoring selected KPIs. 
If more KPIs are standardized across the 
An M-14 minimum-metal, anti-personnel mine from a 
site where the vegetation was removed through burn-
ing. Comparisons of m²/deminer/dour, m²/searcher/day, 
or mines found/day must take into account the nature of 
EO found in order to be valid. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
IED components in Iraq, March 2016. HMA is still to stan-
dardise how such devices may be reported into operator 
and national databases, not only to allow better report-
ing under Article 7 of the APMBC but also to enable such 
databases to be used meaningfully as risk management/
threat assessment tools. 
Image courtesy of Ollie Shepherd.
• Areas.
Total area released 7,929 m2
Total area technically investigated 841 m2
% area technically investigated 11%
• Land release process performed  
(key performance indicators/ratios).
Average demining rate 10.40 m2/deminer/day (6hr)
Average efficiency 5.88 m2/mine
Average deminer day/mine 0.57 deminer days (6hr)
BAC rate 648 m2/deminer/day (6hr)
• Quality non-conformances, complaints, accidents. Nil
• Recommendations for improvement. Nil
• Follow-up actions arising from the review. Nil
Figure 8. KPIs integrated into the Management Review of the Site Implementation Plan document for Minefield 096 in 
the Falkland Islands, December 2017. Note the KPIs selected to be recorded in this key document include total area 
released, total area “technically investigated,” percentage “technically investigated,” average daily deminer rate, aver-
age efficiency expressed in m²/mine, average deminer days/mine, and the BAC rate for areas of the CHA not con-
taminated with mines.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd and SafeLane Global Ltd.
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sector, dashboards showing comparative performance between 
operators at a national level will become easier to generate.
CONCLUSION
Assessing KPIs for operations analysis typically involves 
some form of comparison. For any form of comparison to be 
credible requires standardization. Basic KPIs that help us ana-
lyze operations in context should be welcomed by all in HMA, 
including donors, operators, and NMAAs.
This article has only briefly covered some of the more main-
stream HMA KPIs that the industry might wish to consider 
formally adopting. Relevant KPIs not covered include report-
ing KPIs (e.g., proportion of reports accepted/rejected), acci-
dent KPIs, cost-related KPIs (a metric that has been subject 
to significant debate over the years in HMA), open burning 
open demolition (OBOD) KPIs such as the amount of explo-
sive stores used relative to devices destroyed, and gender and 
diversity KPIs that typically reflect sex and age disaggregated 
data (SADD). These metrics could easily be deemed core KPIs 
and should be considered.
The scope of this subject is extensive but not always easy to 
address, and it is likely any progress to standardize KPIs will 
be incremental, possibly with an initial portion of core KPIs 
being agreed upon, accompanied by some discretionary KPIs 
being suggested. The development of a modest number of stan-
dardized KPIs, viewed strictly in context, is long overdue. 
Development of such KPIs could be done relatively quickly. It 
is time that HMA caught up with other industries. 
See endnotes page 63
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Figure 9. NPA Vietnam Analytical Dashboard showing KPIs concerned with the survey and clearance of areas contam-
inated by cluster munition remnants. 
Figure courtesy of Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).
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(The GICHD is currently developing a Technical Note for HMA on 
“KPIs and Mine Action.” It would welcome any contributions on this 
subject (r.evans@gichd.org). Online training material covering the 
practical use of KPIs during HMA operations is available for free on 
the GICHD E-Learning Platform - https://training.gichd.org/) 
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